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Abstract—Power suppliers can exercise market power to 
gain higher profit. However, this becomes difficult when 
external information is extremely rare. To get a promising 
performance in an extremely incomplete information market 
environment, a novel model-free reinforcement learning 
algorithm based on the Learning Automata (LA) is proposed in 
this paper. Besides, this paper analyses the rationality and 
convergence of the algorithm in case studies based on the 
Cournot market model. 
Keywords—reinforcement learning, learning automata, 
extremely incomplete information, Cournot market model 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. Backgrounds and Motivations 
The power market is a typical imperfectly competitive 
environment for power suppliers. Several power suppliers 
can exercise market power to manipulate the market-
clearing price and gain a higher profit. Besides, the market 
environment is like a black box for power suppliers.  Thus 
many studies have applied reinforcement learning 
algorithms [1] to help power suppliers get optimal bidding 
strategies. Yu [2] and Kebriaei [3] used the Q learning to 
optimize the power suppliers’ bidding strategies. Ye [4] 
applied the DDPG algorithm to help power suppliers bid.  
Note that the optimizations like the above paper still need 
a lot of external information, e.g., the historical bids of the 
opponents, the parameters of the whole system. However, 
privacy protection has been paid more and more attention in 
today’s society [5], which makes it more difficult for power 
companies to obtain external information. And sometimes 
the power suppliers can only get personal data, e.g., 
personal historical bids and profits. To this end, an 
algorithm suitable for this extremely incomplete information 
situation should be studied.  
Learning Automata (LA) is a powerful tool to solve this 
problem. Learning automata is generally introduced in [6]. 
In [7], various learning automates are present, e.g., Finite 
Action Learning Automata (FALA) and Continuous Action 
Learning Automata (CALA). CALA is used widely in 
practical problems because the action space is continuous. 
In [8], CALA is used in the control of broadcast networks. 
And graph spectral partitioning and CALA are studied for 
supervised learning of large perceptual organization in [9]. 
The basic idea of CALA is to modify the probability 
distribution function (PDF) over the action space through 
iterations with the environment. These successful 
applications provide a bright prospect for the applications of 
this idea in the power market.  
B. Contributions and Scope 
The contributions of this paper are outlined below: 
- This paper proposes a novel reinforcement learning 
algorithm to help power suppliers optimize bids in an 
extremely incomplete information environment. 
- Rationality and convergence [10] are tested in a Cournot 
duopoly model [11] without and with transmission line 
constraints.  
C. Paper Organizations 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 
presents the power suppliers’ bidding procedure. Section 
III details the proposed algorithm. Section IV provides case 
studies to demonstrate the effectiveness of the algorithm. 
Section V discusses the conclusions and future extensions of 
this work. 
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION 
A. Market Structure. 
The power market is composed of the power suppliers, 
the power consumers and the market operator. 
The cost function of a single supplier can be written as  
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C mG nG o    (1) 
where m and n are the coefficient of the primary term and 
the secondary term, o is the constant term. G is its power 
output. In the Cournot market model, the supplier has 
motivations to change the bidding quantities to gain higher 
profit. Because there is a trade-off between the power output 
and the potential market clearing price: more power output 
will lead to a lower market-clearing price; less power output 
will lead to a higher market-clearing price. 
The utility function of a single consumer can be written as 
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U wD vD                 (2) 
where w and v is the coefficient of the primary term and the 
secondary term, D is the load demand of the consumer. 
The market operator is to maximize social welfare by 
running the optimal power flow dispatch algorithm [12]. 
The constraints include the power balance constraint, the 
transmission line capacity constraints, etc. 
B. Bidding Procedure 
    In a single round of market clearing, suppliers bid their 
quantities strategically while consumers submit their utility 
functions to the market operators honestly. After the market 
is cleared, the market-clearing prices can be calculated and 
given to the corresponding supplier. And a single supplier 
can calculate the profit  
P CG           (3) 
where P is the profit of the supplier,  is the locational 
marginal price (LMP) where the supplier is located. The 
objective of the supplier is to maximize the profit as (3). 
III. PROPOSED ALGORITHM FOR SUPPLIER’S STRATEGIC 
BIDDING  
A. Proposed Algorithm 
The proposed algorithm is inspired by the CALA 
algorithm in [13]. The idea of the proposed algorithm is to 
modify the mean and the variance of the PDF over action 
space through interactions with the environment. 
The action space in this bidding optimization problem 
under the Cournot market is the limits of bidding quantities. 
We define the PDF at iteration t as a Gaussian Distribution 
N(t,t) (it can be replaced by other distributions according 
to actual needs). Each power supplier bids the random 
action x and the mean action  to the environment 
alternately. Set bx as the profit corresponding to the random 
action x, b as the profit corresponding to the mean action . 
The update rule of the proposed algorithm is demonstrated 
as follows 
1t t k         (4) 
1t t k c           (5) 
where k is the update coefficient of the mean, is the 
update step of the mean, k is the update coefficient of the 
variance, is the update step of the variance, c is a small 
enough coefficient that gradually reduces the variance to 
stabilize the learning process, t is the iteration time. The 
detailed definition of k and k is as follows.  
( ),   if 
( ),   if 
x
u x
sign x b b
k
sign x b b




 
 
 
 (6) 
if &  or
1
&
=
if &  or
-1
&
x
x
x
x
b b x
b b x
k
b b x
b b x





 
 
 
 
  

  

  
   
  (7) 
If the action x results in better profit than the action , we 
move  towards x; otherwise, we move  away from x. And 
we increase  when an action leaves the mean by a standard 
deviation and results in a better reinforcement signal or 
when an action closes to the mean by a standard deviation 
and results in a worse reinforcement signal; otherwise, the  
is decreased. Besides, the update step of mean and standard 
deviation is fixed to a constant value, making the learning 
process more robust and to achieve a better performance in 
convergence. 
This algorithm only needs the supplier’s personal data 
including the historical bids and profits. Then the learning 
process can be executed. This is workable in the extremely 
incomplete information environment. 
The detailed process of the learning process is given in 
the pseudo-code.  
 
B. Rationality and Convergence 
Criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of a multi-agent 
reinforcement learning algorithm are usually rationality and 
convergence.  
Rationality means that if the other suppliers take the 
stationary policies then the learning algorithm will converge 
to a policy that is a best-response to their policies. 
Convergence means that the game will necessarily converge 
to a stationary policy when all the players are using the 
learning algorithm. These two indexes will be analyzed in 
the case study. 
IV. CASE STUDY 
The simulations are run at Matlab2018b on a PC with a 
16GB RAM. The main objective lies in validating its 
rationality and convergence. The topology of the testing 
system [14] is shown in Fig.1. 
 
There are three suppliers and three consumers in the 
system (the lower and upper power output limits are 0 and 
2000MW for the three suppliers, and the power demands for 
consumers are unlimited). The parameters of them are 
shown in TABLE.I. 
TABLE I.  PARAMETERS OF THE 3-BUS SYSTEM 
Node 
Utility Function Cost Function 
wi 
($/MWh) 
vi 
($/MW2h) 
mi 
($/MW2h) 
ni 
($/MWh) 
oi 
($/h) 
1 108.4096 0.0555 0.015718 1.360575 9490 
2 103.8283 0.066909 0.021052 -2.07807 11128 
 
Fig. 1.  3-bus system topology. 
Proposed Algorithm 
1:  Initialize the PDF N(,), define the iteration limit M; 
2:    for t = 1:M do 
3:       if mod(t,2) == 1 then 
4:          at ←  
5:       else if mod(t,2) == 0 then 
6:          at ←x randomly generated from tt
end if 
8:     Choose and submit at to the market operator; 
9:     Gain profit Pt by (3) after the market is cleared; 
10:   Save t, at and Pt as experience to the data buffer; 
11:      if  t > 2 then 
12:         if mod(t,2) == 1 then 
13:               b ← Pt 
14:               bx ← Pt-1 
15：      else if mod(t,2) == 0 then 
16：             b ← Pt-1 
17：             bx ← Pt 
18：      end if 
19：      Perform the PDF update as (4)-(7);  
20:      end if 
21:    end for 
End the Algorithm 
 
3 105.6709 0.063703 0.012956 8.105354 6821 
In the scenario without transmission line constraints, the 
line is unbounded; In the scenario with transmission line 
constraints, the capacity of line 1-3 is bounded to 16MW to 
cause congestion.  
The parameters of the algorithm are as follows.  
The iteration limit M is 6000. and are set to be 1 and 
0.2 respectively. The initial mean and standard deviation are 
600 and 20 respectively. The coefficient c is 10-3. 
And we will compare the learning results calculated by 
the proposed algorithm with the Nash equilibrium calculated 
by the analytical EPEC method [15] (under a global 
perspective for comparison, which is impossible in practice).  
a. Rationality of the algorithm. 
The rationality is judged from three criteria, e.g., the 
profit, the action, and the LMP. To test the rationality, the 
strategies of supplier 2 and supplier 3 are fixed to 1046MW 
and 995MW in the environment without transmission line 
constraints while 1268MW and 645MW in the environment 
with transmission line constraints. The learning results of 
supplier 1 are shown in TABLE. II and TABLE. III 
respectively (the action learned by the proposed algorithm is 
the mean of the PDF). 
TABLE II.  THE LEARNING RESULT WHEN ONLY SUPPLIER 1 LEARNS 
WITHOUT CONSTRAINTS 
Method Supplier 
Criterion 
Profit($/h) Action(MW) LMP($/MWh) 
Proposed 
Algorithm 
1 25231 1103 41.51 
Analytical 
EPEC 
1 25221 1105 41.45 
TABLE III.  THE LEARNING RESULT WHEN ONLY SUPPLIER 1 LEARNS 
WITH CONSTRAINTS 
Method Supplier 
Criterion 
Profit($/h) Action(MW) LMP($/MWh) 
Proposed 
Algorithm 
1 24779 791 51.43 
Analytical 
EPEC 
1 24306 781 50.77 
From these two tables, we can find that the profits, the 
actions and the LMPs are 25231$/h, 1103MW and 
41.51$/MWh without transmission line constraints and 
24779$/h, 791MW and 51.43$/MWh with transmission line 
constraints. The percentage errors of the profits, the actions 
and LMPs are 0.04%, 0.18% and 0.14% without 
transmission line constraints and 1.9%, 1.3% and 1.3% with 
transmission line constraints compared to the best response 
calculated by the analytical EPEC method. The rationality 
of this algorithm is proved.  
b. Convergence of the algorithm. 
To test the convergence of the proposed algorithm, the 
two suppliers are all strategic players using this algorithm. 
The result is shown in TABLE.IV and TABLE.V in the 
scenarios without and with transmission line constraints 
respectively.  
TABLE IV.  THE RESULTS WHEN ALL SUPPLIERS LEARN WITHOUT 
CONSTRAINTS 
Method Supplier 
Criterion 
Profit($/h) Action(MW) LMP($/MWh) 
Proposed 
Algorithm 
1 25436 1109 
41.57 
2 22771 1035 
3 20103 997 
Analytical  
EPEC 
1 25221 1105 
41.45 2 22891 1046 
3 19947 995 
TABLE V.  THE RESULTS WHEN ALL SUPPLIERS LEARN WITH 
CONSTRAINTS 
Method Supplier 
Criterion 
Profit($/h) Action(MW) LMP($/MWh) 
Proposed 
Algorithm 
1 25235 815 50.37 
2 38209 1261 50.32 
3 17476 639 50.27 
Analytical  
1 24306 781 50.77 
2 38949 1268 50.76 
3 17977 645 50.75 
The percentage errors of the profits, the actions and the 
LMPs are shown in TABLE.VI.  
TABLE VI.  PERCENTAGE ERRORS IN DIFFERENT SCENARIOS 
Scenario Supplier 
Criterion 
Profit(%) Action(%) LMP(%) 
Without 
Constraints 
1 0.85 0.36 
0.29 2 0.52 1.1 
3 0.78 0.20 
With 
Constraints  
1 3.8 4.4 0.78 
2 1.9 0.55 0.86 
3 2.8 0.93 0.95 
From these three tables, we can find that: without 
transmission line constraints, the profits of the three 
suppliers are 25436$/h, 22771$/h and 20103$/h, the actions 
are 1109MW, 1035MW and 997MW, the LMPs are 
41.57$/MWh. With transmission line constraints, the profits 
of the three suppliers are 25235$/h, 38209$/h and 17476$/h, 
the actions are 815MW, 1261MW and 639MW, the LMPs 
are 50.37$/MWh, 50.32$/MWh and 50.27$/MWh. The 
percentage errors of the profits, the actions and LMPs are all 
within 4.4% compared to the Nash equilibrium calculated 
by the analytical EPEC method and this proves the 
convergence. The changing process of the profits, the 
actions as well as the LMPs are shown via Fig.2, Fig.3 and 
Fig4. 
 
 
Fig. 2.  Profit of suppliers in the 3-bus system. 
  
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper proposes a novel learning algorithm to help 
power suppliers to optimize bids under extremely 
incomplete information. The simulation results show its 
rationality and convergence.  
This algorithm is of great engineering and practical value 
to instruct the power suppliers to bid wisely. Next, we will 
consider extending the method to a real power network with 
more nodes and further improving the learning speed of the 
method. 
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Fig. 3.  Action of suppliers in the 3-bus system. 
 
Fig. 4. LMP of suppliers in the 3-bus system. 
